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INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, the Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that defense counsel must inform a noncitizen defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.
1 Failure to do so would render counsel's representation below the reasonableness requirement of 1. 559 U.S. 356, 360 (2010); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (explaining that before accepting a criminal plea of guilty, a court must determine that the defendant understands his rights, which include, but are not limited to, the right to be represented by counsel, the waiver of trial rights, any maximum penalty, and any mandatory minimum penalty); Berkow v. State, 573 N.W.2d 91, 95 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969) ("A plea of guilty is a waiver of several trial rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and thus, to be valid as a matter of due process, must be voluntarily and intelligently made.")), aff'd, 583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998). The term "deportation" specifically refers to the process of removing aliens, such as lawful permanent residents, who were legally in the United States but later became removable for a reason such as being convicted of certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012) . An alien who is considered "inadmissible" was not in legal status in the United States at the time of being found subject to removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1183 (2012). "Removal" is " [t] he expulsion of an alien from the United States," which may be based on grounds of "deportability" or "inadmissibility." See Definition of Terms, U.S. DEP'T OF HOME-LAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/definition-terms (last visited Aug. 22, 2014); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012).
the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of counsel. 2 The Supreme Court opened its decision by writing:
The landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramatically over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretionary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of deportation. The 'drastic measure' of deportation or removal . . . is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes. 3 To begin his analysis in Padilla, Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens delivered an eloquent history lesson to support the Court's eventual holding. 4 This is a fitting start to this article as well, because it aims to show that spanning over seventy years, the Supreme Court redefined and solidified the meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to benefit U.S. citizens and noncitizens alike.
A. Padilla Should Apply Retroactively
" [C] ommon law consists of the rules that are generated at the present moment by application of the institutional principles of adjudication."
5 By February 2013, common law provided the Supreme Court with fundamental Sixth Amendment principles on which to base its decision in Chaidez v. United States, but the Court failed to do so. 6 It held that noncitizen defendants whose criminal convictions became final before the Padilla decision was issued could not seek relief based on that decision. 7 Based on the Teague v. Lane analysis, the Court held that the Padilla decision declared a "new rule" because Padilla changed the law in many lower courts. 8 applied retroactively. 9 However, the Court erred in this holding because the primary frame of reference should have been the Supreme Court's prior precedent. 10 Considering the history of Supreme Court cases construing the meaning of the Sixth Amendment and the language used by the Supreme Court in Padilla, the Court in Chaidez departed from longstanding principles protecting constitutional due process and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
11 Therefore, Padilla should apply retroactively to provide relief to noncitizens whose convictions were already final on the date of that decision.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
On March 31, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court in Padilla held that defense counsel must inform her client whether his guilty plea in criminal proceedings carried a risk of deportation.
12 This holding was based on the foundation of Supreme Court cases concerning the Sixth Amendment right to counsel dating back to over seventy years prior.
13

A. The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Johnson v. Zerbst
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against CRIMMIGRATION (Feb. 22, 2013) , http://crimmigration.com/2013/02/22/chaidez-v-us -assuming-teague-applies-padilla-announced-a-new-rule/ (citing Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1120 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (explaining that the "new rule" test in Teague has been characterized as "objective," and that therefore the proper frame of reference was the Supreme Court's own jurisprudence)); see also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 309 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[When using] rule[s] designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent.").
11. See Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1115-16, 1115 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 12. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. 13. Id. at 365-66 ("[A]dvice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
14 In 1938, the Supreme Court held in Johnson v. Zerbst that one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment is that the court must appoint counsel to assist a criminal defendant if the defendant has not waived his right to counsel. 15 The Court explained that the holding protects the fundamental human rights of life and liberty for all people. 16 It recognized that the average defendant does not have the adequate legal skill to preserve these rights, especially when he must defend himself against an experienced opponent in the prosecution. 17 The Court explained that the seemingly simple, orderly, and necessary knowledge a lawyer possesses often is intricate, complex, and mysterious to an untrained layman.
18 Accordingly, Johnson affirmed that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel for a criminal defendant.
19
B. Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart
Approximately a half-century later, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Strickland v. Washington. 20 Charles Strickland pled guilty to three murder counts, and after the trial judge sentenced Strickland to death, Strickland sought collateral relief on the ground that his defense counsel had rendered ineffective assistance at his prior sentencing proceeding. 21 Strickland argued his counsel's assistance was 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 15. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) ("If the accused . . . is not represented by counsel and has not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the hearing of trial may be lost in the course of the proceedings due to failure to complete the court-as the Sixth Amendment requires-by providing counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. The Court addressed the question: What does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel actually mean, and how effective does the defense counsel have to be? 25 The Supreme Court in Strickland found that, in order to prove defense counsel was ineffective, a defendant must show that his counsel's ineffectiveness led to a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights. 26 The Court made this determination based on a two-part test: (1) whether the performance of defense counsel fell below a "highly deferential" standard of "reasonably effective performance"; and (2) whether the performance prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial, i.e. "that there is a reasonable [probability] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would be different." 27 The Court explained that a "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 28 The totality of the evidence must be considered, and the main focus in deciding an ineffective assistance claim must be the "fundamental fairness" of the challenged proceeding. 29 The Court found that defense counsel's conduct was reasonable and that Strickland did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death sentence and permitting a new hearing. 30 The 35 The Court explained that it "broke no new ground" by remanding the case to be consistent with the standards laid out in Strickland and Lockhart.
36
C. Noncitizens' Rights Pre-Padilla
Prior to the Padilla decision in 2010, most courts did not extend the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to require defense counsel to advise a noncitizen client of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. 37 Courts labeled immigration consequences as "indirect or collateral consequences that did not fall within constitutional protection." 38 For example, in 1987, the Florida Supreme Court considered in State v. Ginebra whether a noncitizen defendant may "collaterally attack his guilty plea on the basis that his counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that the guilty plea could subject him to deportation." 39 The court held that defense counsel must only advise his client of the direct consequences of a guilty plea to satisfy the effective assistance standard. 40 This did not include possible deportation. 41 The court reasoned that the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the "areas which a trial court judge must inquire of the defendant before accepting a guilty plea." 42 The direct consequences the trial judge must address are encompassed by "only those consequences of the sentence which the trial court can impose." 43 The court opined that a defense counsel's duty, in regard to guilty pleas, is to provide the defendant "with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, so that the accused may make an informed and conscious choice between accepting the prosecution's offer and going to trial." 44 A guilty plea without knowledge of deportation consequences does not undermine the plea itself. 45 In a similar fashion, the Arizona Court of Appeals in State v. Vera held that the "potential deportation of an alien defendant is deemed a collateral consequence of his guilty plea because that sanction is controlled by an agency which operates beyond the direct authority of the trial judge."
46 Many courts at the federal level followed this reasoning as well, holding that the only consequences relevant to be considered for a guilty plea are those that are pertinent to the trial itself. 47 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Campbell, explained that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require that guilty pleas be voluntary and that they may be withdrawn in the interest of justice. 48 The court elaborated that actual knowledge of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is not a prerequisite to the entry of a knowing and intelligent plea; therefore, the lack thereof does not render a plea involuntary. The court in Campbell expressly declined to follow Edwards v. State because it did not agree that counsel was required to inform her client of collateral consequences such as deportation. 50 On January 21, 1981, Florida's Third District Court of Appeal held in Edwards that the noncitizen defendant would be entitled to relief based upon ineffective assistance of counsel, and could vacate his conviction if he could prove four things: (1) he was not advised by his counsel of the deportation consequence; (2) he was not otherwise aware of the consequence; (3) had he known he would be deported, he would not have entered a guilty plea; and (4) the conviction would, in fact, result in deportation. 51 The Edwards court explained that a collateral consequence of a guilty plea is not necessarily an insignificant consequence. 52 At times, deportation is a far more extreme penalty than the direct consequences that result from a guilty plea to an offense. 53 Courts have described deportation to be "'the equivalent of banishment,' 'a savage penalty,' 'a life sentence of exile,' and an event that results in 'loss of property or life; or of all that makes life worthwhile. '" 54 By looking at deportation in this light, the Edwards court found that a defendant lacking awareness of these consequences cannot make an informed and intelligent choice.
55
Edwards dispelled the notion that potential deportation should be an obvious consequence to a noncitizen defendant. 56 The court compared it to an American citizen's rights, such as the right to plead not guilty and maintain innocence, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to confront the witnesses against him. 57 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.172 requires "that these and other fundamental rights be diligently explained to every defendant before [they enter a guilty plea and waive these rights]."
58 Edwards cautioned that courts must not make assumptions that basic rights are known or understood. 59 The right of a noncitizen defendant to receive effective counsel and be made aware of deportation consequences is no different than other fundamental rights; thus defense counsel should provide a defendant with correct advice concerning potential immigration consequences. 60 The Fifth District Court of Appeals of Indiana, in deciding Williams v. State, followed this reasoning and differentiated between the duties of the trial court and of defense counsel. 61 The court held that a trial court is under no duty to inform a noncitizen defendant of deportation consequences. 62 However, the court found that defense counsel had a more general duty to provide his client an opportunity to enter a plea of guilty that is voluntary, intelligent, informed, and consciously chosen. 63 An attorney's duties to his client are not divided by a "bright line" drawn between direct and collateral consequences. 64 The court explained that the Sixth Amendment "guarantees the right to counsel at any critical stage of prosecution where counsel's absence 'might [detract] from the [defendant's] right to a fair trial.'" 65 The purpose of defense counsel is to be a "guiding hand" at every step in the process, and this purpose would not be 57 70 A grand jury indicted Padilla for "trafficking more than five pounds of marijuana, possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and operating a tractor/trailer without a weight and distance tax number." 71 In exchange for a dismissal of the tractor/trailer violation and sentence of ten years, Padilla, represented by counsel, entered a guilty plea to the three drugrelated charges.
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Before the Supreme Court, Padilla claimed that his counsel failed to advise him that he would be deported if he entered a guilty plea. 73 Padilla asserted that his counsel told him that he "did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long."
74 Padilla alleged that he would have taken his case to trial had his attorney given him proper advice. 75 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether Padilla's counsel had an obligation to advise him that a guilty plea in his case would result in his deportation from the United States. 76 
B. History of the Relationship Between Criminal Convictions and Deportation
The Supreme Court in Padilla explained that the immigration consequences of a conviction have always been a major consideration during the sentencing procedure in criminal proceedings. 79 In 1917, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1917, which allowed judges to issue a judicial recommendation against deportation, or "JRAD." 80 A JRAD provided protection for noncitizens, which minimized the risk of unjust deportation, and a judge had the power to declare that the alien would not be deported based on the particular conviction at hand. 81 JRADs were even issued and considered valid in certain cases for crimes involving moral turpitude, such as narcotics offenses. assistance of counsel included that defense counsel request a JRAD where prevention of deportation was warranted.
83
Post-Janvier, the immigration implications of criminal convictions and guilty pleas for noncitizens became even greater. 84 Congress abolished the use of JRADs in 1990, and in 1996, eliminated the Attorney General's discretionary authority to vacate removal orders for noncitizens convicted of crimes. 85 Now, but for limited exceptions, removal from the United States is "practically inevitable" when a noncitizen commits an offense subjecting him to an order of deportation. 86 Considering this development in judicial procedure and law, the Supreme Court in Padilla found that deportation is a vital part of the sentencing procedure for noncitizen criminal defendants, and accurate legal advice concerning a guilty plea is more important than ever.
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C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The Supreme Court in Padilla rejected the importance that the Kentucky Supreme Court placed on deportation being a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. 88 In fact, the Supreme Court explained that it is irrelevant as to whether deportation was a collateral or direct consequence of a guilty plea because it had never applied a distinction between direct and collateral consequences in reference to the scope of "reasonable professional assistance." 89 Deportation has always been a "particularly severe penalty," and is "intimately related to the criminal process." 90 As discussed earlier, criminal convictions and the penalty of deportation have been linked together for nearly a century. 91 The evaluation of deportation as a direct or collateral consequence is inappropriate in this context. 
D. The Strickland Test
The Supreme Court held that advice regarding deportation fell into the Sixth Amendment's protection for criminal defendants and that the Strickland test applied to Padilla's claim. 93 The Strickland test is a two-pronged approach: (1) "whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"; and (2) "whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 94 The first prong is linked to the expectations of the legal community, and the proper measure of attorney performance is the "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." 95 The Court found that prevailing professional norms supported the view that defense counsel must advise the defendant of the risk of deportation, because " [p] reserving the client's right to remain in the United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence." 96 The Supreme Court explained the difference in duty for defense counsel assisting defendants with complex immigration issues from that of defense counsel assisting defendants with straightforward immigration concerns. 97 When counsel can easily determine through a simple reading of the applicable immigration statute that deportation is warranted for the defendant, counsel is required to provide correct advice concerning this consequence of a guilty plea. 98 Further, the Court explained that immigration law can be complex, and there will be situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain. 99 The duty of defense counsel in such cases is more limited. 100 When the immigration law is not "succinct and straightforward," a criminal defense attorney is only required to advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences. 101 Padilla's defense counsel could have determined that Padilla's plea would make him deportable simply from reading the text of the statute, which specifically commanded that Padilla's controlled substances charge would result in deportation. 103 Padilla's counsel affirmatively advised him that his conviction would not result in deportation, despite the fact that his deportation was presumptively mandatory. 104 The United States argued that these types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims must be limited to "affirmative misadvice," and only if defense counsel chose to discuss immigration consequences. 105 The Court dispelled this notion as absurd, holding that there is no difference "between an act of commission and an act of omission."
106 If the Court held otherwise, an incentive would exist for counsel to remain silent on these matters, which would compete with the obligation to advise the client of "the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement."
107 Further, it is the duty of counsel to provide the client with advice about deportation; the failure to do so "clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis." 108 The Court held that Padilla's counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation by failing to correctly advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
109 Therefore, the Court effectively declared a final ruling that, in general, defense counsel is required to advise his noncitizen client of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. 110 102. Id. While this logic seems straightforward, its application may be difficult. The line to be drawn between simple and complex immigration issues may not be very clear.
103. Id. at 368; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012) ("Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of Title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.").
104. 
III. PADILLA: RETROACTIVE OR NOT?
A. The "Retroactivity" Issue
The next issue before the Court was whether the holding in Padilla would apply retroactively. 111 The legal term "retroactive" means "anything that is applicable or effective from a date earlier than the present date."
112 Often, courts must determine the proper limitations on the temporal reach of statutes or case law. 113 For example, in Whorton v. Bockting, the Supreme Court addressed whether the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington applied retroactively. 114 In Crawford, the Court held that statements of hearsay are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable, and where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 115 Crawford overruled prior Supreme Court precedent in Ohio v. Roberts.
116
The Court in Bockting held that Crawford did not apply retroactively; thus, it did not apply to cases prior to the Court issuing the Crawford decision. 120 About twenty years later, she assisted in defrauding an automobile insurance company out of $26,000 by staging a car accident. 121 In June 2003, Chaidez was indicted on three counts of fraud, and in December 2003, she pled guilty to two of those counts. 122 In April 2004, the court sentenced her to four years of probation, which she did not appeal.
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According to United States immigration law, the offenses to which Chaidez pleaded guilty were "aggravated felonies," which rendered her eligible for deportation. 124 The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") initiated removal proceedings against Chaidez in 2009, discovering the felony conviction when she submitted an application for citizenship. 125 To avoid deportation, Chaidez filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in March 2010, complaining that her attorney did not inform her that pleading guilty would subject her to deportation. 126 One week later, the Supreme Court held in Padilla that a noncitizen could bring a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to inform the defendant that a guilty plea would result in deportation. 127 In August 2010, the Illinois District Court held that Padilla may be applied retroactively to Chaidez's case despite the fact that her conviction became final before the Supreme Court decided Padilla.
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Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in August 2011 and held that Padilla declared a "new rule" and did not apply retroactively, thus making Chaidez ineligible for relief under Padilla. 129 The Supreme Court in Chaidez applied the retroactivity analysis from Teague v. Lane, which held that a "case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final." 131 In that scenario, a person is not eligible for relief under the rule if his or her conviction was already final when the Court declared the "new rule."
132 On the other hand, a case does not announce a "new rule" when it is merely an application of an established principle to a different set of facts. 133 In this situation, the Court's holding may be applied retroactively, thus granting a means of relief for those whose convictions became final before the ruling.
134
D. The Supreme Court Declined to Apply Padilla Retroactively
The Supreme Court in Chaidez held that Padilla did not apply retroactively because the Padilla decision established a "new rule" in its holding. 135 The Court explained that "garden-variety" applications of the test in Strickland do not produce new rules under the Teague analysis.
136 Applications of established principles to different sets of facts do not yield new rules. 137 The Court explained that if the Padilla court had simply applied the Strickland test to Padilla's claim and found that "a lawyer who neglects to inform a client about the risk of deportation is professionally incompetent," then Padilla could Padilla first held that advice concerning deportation was not "categorically removed" from the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 140 The Padilla Court further held that a direct versus collateral consequences analysis was "ill-suited" when applying the Strickland test. 141 The Court in Chaidez explained, prior to asking how the Strickland test applied, that Padilla asked whether that test applied at all, a question that came to the Padilla Court "unsettled" by other courts. 142 Most courts, but not all, held that the Sixth Amendment did not require attorneys to inform their clients of a conviction's collateral consequences, including deportation.
143 Therefore, the Padilla Court "broke new ground," imposed a new obligation for defense counsel, and altered the law of most jurisdictions. 144 Chaidez held that Padilla created a new rule, and it did not "apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review when Padilla was decided."
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E. Supreme Court Cases Finding New Laws Not Retroactive
Before the Chaidez decision, the Supreme Court addressed similar retroactivity issues in other cases and used the Teague analysis.
146 For example, in Bockting, the Supreme Court addressed whether a new interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause would be applied retroactively. 147 A Nevada trial court convicted Martin Bockting for sexual assault on his six-year-old stepdaughter. 148 The court allowed Bockting's wife and a police detective to testify concerning the stepdaughter's out-of-court statements, otherwise known as hearsay, because the court determined that the child was too distressed to testify. 149 cumstance. 159 The Supreme Court in Banks applied the Teague analysis and held that Mills was a new rule because it "broke new ground" by specifically extending Lockett's principles to the rules governing individual jurors. 160 Thus, the Court did not apply Mills retroactively to the defendant's case in Banks. 161 In the two situations discussed above, the Supreme Court did not apply cases retroactively where there had been explicit overruling of prior precedent.
IV. ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF PADILLA
For the reasons stated below, the Supreme Court erred in Chaidez by finding Padilla to be a "new rule." Padilla was a new application of an old rule from Teague; therefore, Padilla should apply retroactively to cases already final before the date the Supreme Court issued the Padilla decision.
A. The Supreme Court in Chaidez Should Have Relied upon Its Own Precedent
The majority's holding in Chaidez is supported by faulty reasoning. Before determining how the Strickland test applied, the Supreme Court in Padilla addressed whether the test applied at all. 162 Padilla held that Strickland applied, but also that the analysis would not depend on whether "deportation" was a collateral consequence or not, thus contradicting many lower courts. 163 According to the Chaidez majority, this preliminary determination by Padilla was an excessive step beyond simply administering a Strickland test analysis. 164 Thus, Padilla created a new rule because it disagreed with the analysis used by many lower courts. 165 The Court erred in this reasoning because the Supreme Court should be the proper vantage point from which to judge the newness of a rule under Teague, not lower courts. 166 termining when a case establishes a new rule is 'objective,' and the mere existence of conflicting authority does not necessarily mean a rule is new." 167 The Supreme Court cases discussed above, Bockting and Banks, forge a synthesis to show that the Supreme Court should have relied on its own precedent to conduct a Teague analysis. In Bockting, the Court found the rule in question to be a "new rule" because the Court overruled prior Supreme Court precedent. 168 Further, the Court relied solely on a slew of Supreme Court cases to derive the foundation for its analysis. 169 In Banks, the Supreme Court examined whether the Mills decision was a sufficiently novel extension of the Court's earlier holding in Lockett to compel a finding that Mills constituted a "new rule." 170 The Court held that it was a new rule, coming to its decision by analyzing prior Supreme Court precedent and examining the language of Lockett and Mills.
171
B. Padilla Did Not Declare a "New Rule"
The plain language of the Padilla decision dictates that the Supreme Court's determination in Chaidez is unfounded. In fact, the Padilla majority held that the Court had never distinguished between direct and collateral consequences in defining the scope of reasonable professional assistance required under Strickland.
172 Padilla did not create a new rule, but merely asserted that an improper analysis had been previously applied by the Kentucky Supreme Court. 173 The dissent in Chaidez explained that Padilla demonstrated that lower courts were misguided by applying a direct versus collat-eral consequences review. 174 Padilla declared that Strickland was the proper analysis alone and applied it to the facts of the case. 175 Under Teague, a holding of this type is applied retroactively. 176 The majority in Chaidez held that Padilla declared a "new rule" by first deciding whether or not to apply the Strickland test. 177 In layman's terms, the Padilla Court figured out what they were going to do before they did it, and according to the majority in Chaidez, this type of action constitutes a "new" rule of law. 178 In reality, "Padilla did nothing more than apply the existing rule of Strickland in a new setting, the same way the Court had done repeatedly in the past." 179 The dissent in Chaidez disagreed with the majority because, in its opinion, "Padilla fell squarely within the metes and bounds established by Strickland."
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Strickland "did not provide a comprehensive definition of deficient performance," but rather held that, "'[t]he proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,'" which are subject to change. 181 Despite the many different settings in which Strickland had been applied, the Supreme Court has yet to find that an application of Strickland constitutes a new rule. 182 Rather, when the Court applies "Strickland in a way that corresponds to an evolution in professional norms," no new law is made.
183
The Supreme Court in Roe v. Flores-Ortega explained, "[a]s with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular case." 184 The Court expounded in Wright v. West that because this is "a rule designed for the specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not dictated by precedent."
185 Generally, applications of Strickland to new factual scenarios do not yield new rules. 186 For example, in Wiggins v. Smith, the Supreme Court "found that Williams v. Taylor 'made no new law' when it held that Strickland extended to an attorney's responsibility to conduct a background investigation in a capital case." 187 Rather, "in referring to the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice as guides, [Williams] applied the same 'clearly established' precedent of Strickland," that the Court applied in Padilla. 188 Equally, in Lafler v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment extended to advice concerning plea offers, because failure to provide this advice constituted attorney misconduct covered by Strickland. 189 When the Court applies "Strickland in a way that corresponds to an evolution in professional norms," no new law is made. 190 
C. The Supreme Court Expected Courts to Apply Padilla Retroactively
The Supreme Court in Padilla addressed the concern of how its decision would affect decisions already final on direct review. 191 The Court did not preclude the theoretical possibility of an "effect on those convictions already obtained as the result of plea bargains," although it called such an effect "unlikely." 192 The Court was not worried about a floodgate of excessive claims opening because it felt that "lower courts-now quite experienced with applying Strickland-can effectively and efficiently use its framework to separate specious claims from those with substantial merit."
193 Not only did the Court anticipate retroactive application of its decision to cases already final on direct review, but it explained that lower courts
